Abstract This paper briefly surveys how authorisation in Grid computing has evolved during the last few years, and presents the latest developments in which Grid applications can utilise a policy controlled authorisation infrastructure to make decisions about which users are allowed to perform which actions on which Grid resources. The paper describes the Global Grid Forum SAML interface for connecting policy based authorisation infrastructures to Grid applications, and then describes the PERMIS authorisation infrastructure which has implemented this interface. The paper concludes with suggestions about how this work will evolve in the future.
Introduction
Grid computing allows resources, including large scale expensive ones such as genetic databases, to be shared between members of virtual organisations (VOs). However, if an organisation is to allow its resources to be shared amongst its VO partners, it needs to be able to determine who is authorised to access these resources in which ways, and who is not. Ideally each resource owner should be able to set the policy determining the rules for who is authorised to do what, and then leave the authorisation infrastructure to enforce this policy. The resource owner should not be expected to individually identify and name each VO user who is to access his/her resource, as this soon becomes unwieldy and costly to manage. The resource owner should be able to delegate to other partners in the VO the ability to identify and nominate the users from their respective domain who are to be allowed to use his/her resource, leaving him/her to simply determine what type of access to grant to the different categories of user. It is only very recently that we have been able to achieve this, as will be described here.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Next section provides a brief history of Grid authorisation. Then the current Global Grid Forum draft authorisation interface is described. Further the PERMIS policy based authorisation infrastructure that is compatible with the GGF interface is described. Finally last section concludes and looks at possible future work in this area. 8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15   16   17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35   36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56 57 58
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2 A brief history of Grid authorisation 3 One of the earliest attempts at providing author-4 isation in VOs was in the form of the Globus Toolkit 5 Gridmap files (Sotomayor) . This file simply holds 6 a list of the authenticated distinguished names of 7 the Grid users and the equivalent local user 8 account names that they are to be mapped into. 9 Access control to a resource is then left up to the 10 local operating system and application access 11 control mechanisms. As can be seen, this neither 12 allows the local resource administrator to set 13 a policy for who is allowed to do what, nor does 14 it minimise his/her workload. On the contrary it 15 maximises the work of the resource administrator 16 since (s)he must first pre-configure the Grid appli-17 cation with the names of every VO user who is to 18 be allowed to access the Grid resource, and then 19 (s)he must set the access controls on the local 20 operating system and/or application to ensure that 21 the local user names are restricted in what they 22 are allowed to do with the resource. The system is 23 neither scalable nor flexible, and there is no way 24 to distribute the administrative task throughout 25 the VO. Consequently several ways were devel-26 oped to improve upon this. 27
The Community Authorisation Service (CAS) 28 (Pearlman et al., 2002) was the next attempt by 29 the Globus team to improve upon the manage-30 ability of user authorisation. CAS allows a resource 31 owner to grant access to a portion of his/her 32 resource to a VO (or community e hence the name 33 CAS), and then let the community determine who 34 can use this allocation. The resource owner thus 35 partially delegates the allocation of authorisation 36 rights to the community. This is achieved by having 37 a CAS server, which acts as a trusted intermediary 38 between VO users and resources. Users first con-39 tact the CAS asking for permission to use a Grid 40 resource. The CAS consults its policy (which 41 specifies who has permission to do what on which 42 resources) and if granted, returns a digitally self-43 signed capability to the user optionally containing 44 policy details about what the user is allowed to do 45 (as an opaque string). The user then contacts the 46 resource and presents this capability. 
111 policy for access to his/her resource and then let 112 the authorisation infrastructure enforce this policy 113 on his/her behalf. This is what systems like Akenti 114 (Johnston et al., 1998) , PERMIS (Chadwick et al., 115 2003) , and Keynote (Blaze et al., 1999) 
modes are possible, pull and push. In pull mode the PDP fetches the credentials, in push mode the PEP provides them. If the PDP is to fetch the credentials, how does it know where to get them from? The PDP could either be preconfigured with a (probably static) list of credential sources, or the client could tell the server where to pull the credentials from at the time of decision making. The latter is more scalable, and more dynamic than the former. Thus the GGF profile defines a Reference Statement which points to a repository where user credentials are located.
-Default values for all the parameters of the authorisation decision request. These are specified in the GGF draft as follows: if the name of the initiator is missing it is assumed to be anyone i.e. public access is being requested; if the requested action is missing it is assumed to be everything i.e. all the rights that have been granted to the initiator; if the target is missing it is assumed to be all the resources that are protected by the PDP policy; if the initiator's credentials are missing then only the default ones (if any) that have been granted to everyone should be used. Note that no default values for the contextual information have been specified since in general it is not possible to define these. -If too little information is passed to the PDP, it may simply deny access. Alternatively, at its discretion, the PDP may return ''Granted subject to'' along with a set of conditions that must be fulfilled before access is granted, e.g., Granted subject to the time being between 9 am and 5 pm. It is then the responsibility of the PEP to evaluate these conditions before granting access to the initiator. If the PEP is unable or unwilling to evaluate these conditions, it always has the option of issuing a new decision request and sending more information to the PDP (such as the missing contextual information).
239
Once this interface had been defined by the 240 GGF, it then needed to be implemented and tested 241 in one or more Grid applications to ensure that it 242 meets the needs of the Grid community. ). However, each re-281 source owner, when setting the policy that con-282 trols access to his/her Grid resource, states which 283 attribute authorities (s)he trusts to issue X.509 284 ACs, and the PERMIS PDP will then discard all ACs 285 presented to it that are not digitally signed by one 286 of these trusted authorities. Thus we have partly 287 accomplished one of our earlier stated goals, i.e. 288 that a resource owner should be able to specify 289 a policy for controlling access to his/her resource, 290 and then leave the authorisation infrastructure to 291 enforce it. 292 The PERMIS distribution contains three software 293 tools for creating X.509 ACs. A user friendly graph-294 ical Attribute Certificate Manager (see Fig. 2 ) 295 is designed to make it very easy for managers to 296 assign basic ACs to their staff, one by one. A more 297 sophisticated Privilege Allocator can create more 298 complex ACs, whilst a bulk loader tool is designed to 299 allow large numbers of users to be automatically 
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300 allocated ACs. The bulk loader works by searching 301 an LDAP directory for users who have specific 302 attributes, then creating a specific AC for each of 303 them and writing these back to their respective 304 LDAP entries. 305 PERMIS provides a PDP that reads in the policy 306 set by the resource owner at initialisation time. It 307 then makes access control decisions for each 308 authorisation decision request provided by the 309 PEP, based on this policy. The interface between 310 the PDP and the PEP is implemented as a Java API 311 (for applications that want to combine the PDP and 312 PEP as one program), and as SAML requests over 313 SOAP and HTTP (for stand alone PDP servers, as 314 used by GT3.3). 315
The user's X.509 ACs can be pushed to the 316 PERMIS PDP by the PEP, either as complete X.509 317 ACs, or as SAML Reference Statements. The PDP 318 can also pull X.509 ACs from a set of pre-config-319 ured LDAP servers, or from the locations specified 320 in the Reference Statements. 321 PERMIS policies are written in XML, according to 322 a DTD published at www.xml.org. This DTD pre-323 dates the XACML specification (OASIS, 2000b) , and 324 for the most part is a subset of XACML, except that 325 the PERMIS policy supports delegation of authority, 326 a feature not currently supported by XACML. The 327 PERMIS authorisation policy is a set of sub-policies, 328 namely:
SubjectPolicy e this specifies the valid subject domains i.e. only users from these subject domains may be authorised to access resources covered by this policy. Each domain is specified as an LDAP subtree, using Include DN and Exclude DN statements. In Grid environments each user has a unique DN contained in his public key certificate. If his DN is not within a valid subject domain, the user will be denied all access to resources in the VO covered by this policy. RoleHierarchyPolicy e this specifies the different roles and attributes that can be allocated to users, and the hierarchical relationships (if any) between them. A superior role inherits all the privileges of a subordinate role, as in conventional RBAC. Using role hierarchies can simplify Role Assignment Policies. SOAPolicy e this specifies which attribute authorities (or Sources Of Authority) are trusted to allocate roles and attributes to users. This is the way that a resource owner specifies who within (and without) the VO is to be trusted to issue ACs. 110  111  112  113  114  324  325  326  327  328  329  330  331  332  333  334  335  336  337  338  339  340  341  342 
RoleAssignmentPolicy e this specifies which roles and attributes may be allocated to which subjects by which SOAs, whether delegation of authority may take place or not, and how long the issued ACs are considered valid by this policy. This sub-policy effectively states who is trusted to allocate which roles to whom, and is central to the distributed management of trust. It can stop a trusted manager in one organisation issuing attributes or roles to staff in another organisation. Allowing delegation will allow a staff member to assign his/her attributes to another staff member. By restricting the validity of ACs, an issued AC may have a validity period of 2 years, but the resource owner may have a more stringent policy and be not prepared to accept ACs older than 1 year. TargetPolicy e this specifies the target domains in which resources covered by this policy are located. Each domain is specified as either an LDAP subtree, using Include DN and Exclude DN statements, or as a URL. Resources can further be refined by specifying their type e.g. all fileservers within the o Z Salford, c Z GB domain. ActionPolicy e this specifies the actions (or methods) supported by the various target resources, along with the parameters that should be passed along with each request e.g. action Open with parameter Filename. TargetAccessPolicy e this specifies which roles and attributes are needed in order to perform which actions on which targets, and under which conditions. Note that this part of the policy, being ABAC, is not concerned with the distinguished names of the users. Conditions are specified using Boolean logic and might contain constraints such as ''IF time is GT 9 am AND time is LT 5 pm OR IF Calling IP address is a subset of 125.67.x.x''. All actions that are not specified in a Target Access Policy are denied. 
